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IN THE REGULATION OF MANMADE 
CARCINOGENS, IF FEASIBILITY 
ANALYSIS IS THE ANSWER, WHAT IS 
THE QUESTION? 
Christopher H. Schroeder* 
ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW. By Frank B. 
Cross. New York: Quorum Books. 1989. Pp. xv, 229. $45. 
I 
For more than a generation, cancer has been America's most 
feared disease. Cancer deaths are frequently long, debilitating, and in-
exorable. In addition to its toll on its immediate victims, cancer brings 
extended grief and, all too frequently, financial disaster to the families 
of its victims. In the early part of this century, the disease was not so 
singled out for attention - tuberculosis, polio, bubonic plague, mala-
ria, and measles all competed with cancer for attention as public 
health problems and for primacy in each citizen's private economy of 
dread. Now, medical science has .largely mastered treatments and 
preventions for these other diseases, leaving cancer with fewer compet-
itors.1 Eliminating these rival sources of death has done more than 
simply leave cancer with fewer challengers; because people no longer 
die of these other affiictions, our life-spans have been increased suffi-
ciently so that cancer, typically a disease of the middle-aged and eld-
erly, has a much greater opportunity to claim its victims (pp. 17-18). 
Americans are convinced that our advances in science play another 
major role in cancer causation, thereby contributing to its prominence 
as a public concern in yet another way. Numerous chemicals now 
used throughout the American economy have been linked to cancer, 
either through epidemiological studies of groups with an abnormally 
high incidence of cancer, especially workers in chemical and chemical-
related industries, or through laboratory experiments on animals. 
Many of these chemicals, such as the synthetic hydrocarbons that 
form the basis of the plastics industry, were literally unknown to the 
planet before the Second World War. Others, like asbestos, were not a 
substantial problem until industrial uses dramatically expanded their 
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1968, Princeton University; M.Div. 1971, Yale 
University; J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. 
1. Recently Alzheimer's disease and, even more recently, AIDS have begun to rival cancer as 
sources of fear and unease among the general population. 
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dissemination. By virtue of scientific advance, we are guilty of fouling 
our own nest in an especially dreadful way. 
Given the vast positive contributions of postwar technology to our 
modern standard of living, such manmade sources of cancer might 
have emerged in our social and cultural constructions as the grim but 
inevitable product of a bargain struck so that we might reap the bene-
fits of the Chemical Age. In fact, this is not at all how the problem of 
manmade carcinogens is perceived. Most Americans do not associate 
the responsibility for such sources with the "us" of the Pogo comic 
strip.2 Instead, they see villains and victims, those who have reaped 
the benefits and those upon whom cancer has been imposed. There are 
just enough stories around of companies suppressing evidence of can-
cer risks or acting in apparent disregard of substantial risks to fuel the 
perception of manmade chemicals as the victimization of the Ameri-
can populace. 3 
Substantial fear of bodily harm, combined with a perception that 
some other persons are responsible, produces enormous pressure for 
governmental action and legal redress. While conventional tort litiga-
tion is an obvious starting place for such redress, cancer has proven 
highly resistant to the established doctrines of tort and nuisance.4 
Even if common law tort actions had proven more adequate, political 
entrepreneurs would probably have packaged legislative proposals to 
address cancer fears. As it was, the overwhelming failure of tort to 
assuage Americans' sense of indignation virtually ensured a large vol-
ume of legislation aimed at the cancer risk. In the past twenty-five 
years, Congress has written a vast array of legislation aimed at reduc-
ing exposures to manmade cancer agents. 
Perhaps a vast disarray of legislation would be a more apt descrip-
tion. Throughout this past quarter century, politicians, industry, envi-
ronmental organizations, and federal agencies have been struggling to 
define an appropriate policy toward manmade carcinogens. The result 
of all this "policymaking" has been a patchwork of some twenty or so 
separate statutes that exhibits few unifying principles. Its burdensome 
2. "We have met the enemy, and he is us." 
3. See, for example, the account of the asbestos industry's apparent coverup of medical con-
cerns about exposure to airborne asbestos in P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE 
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985). 
4. To date, the most intractable obstacle has been the requirement that a plaintiff be able to 
prove cause-in-fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Given our present inabilities to link 
cancer to specific causes, the typical cancer plaintiff will be unable to sustain that burden. The 
more we learn about cancer etiology, the more difficult it becomes to isolate single causes. See, 
e.g., pp. 3-16. Critiques of tort's cause-in-fact requirement, proposals to reform that require-
ment, as well as analyses of other doctrinal obstacles facing the typical cancer plaintiff, are exten-
sive. In addition to pp. 161-217, see, for example, Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 
1219 (1987); Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981); Rosenberg, Tire Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 
"Public Law" Vision of tire Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Robinson, Probabilistic 
Causation and Compensation/or Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985). 
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and sometimes conflicting mandates have created a Gordian knot that 
administering agencies have been largely unable to cut. Agencies have 
been slow to regulate any manmade chemicals at all; they have appar-
ently ignored serious risks while acting against relatively trivial ones 
(p. 126), and the regulations they have produced bear no consistent 
relationship to one another or to any discernible principle of regula-
tory decisionmaking.5 Some fair portion of their energies are dissi-
pated attempting to torture impossible statutory commands into some 
defensible course of action that comports with "administrative reality" 
(p. 129). In short, statutory implementation can best be characterized 
as one of "delay, ineffectiveness, and inconsistency" (p. 129). 
Among the more puzzling attributes of this regulatory disarray, 
federal cancer laws employ several fundamentally different regulatory 
techniques.6 In Environmentally Induced Cancer and the Law, Frank 
Cross7 identifies four such techniques, or "paradigms" for cancer con-
trol - "zero risk," "significant risk," "cost-benefit analysis," and 
"feasibility analysis" (p. 69). Some of the important differences be-
tween these techniques can be illuminated by treating them as in-
stances of three more general categories. Thus, zero risk and 
significant risk are members of the broader category of health-based 
standards, cost-benefit is a special case of balancing standards, and fea-
sibility analysis is a technology-based standard. 8 
Health-based standards mandate that exposure levels be set to en-
sure against stipulated health risks or adverse environmental effects. 
The process of setting permissible levels under health-based standards9 
theoretically ignores the costs of complying with them. 10 Such stan-
5. See, for example, Cross's description of divergences of approach and policy by the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration in deciding whether and how to regulate formaldehyde. Pp. 
102, 122, 126. 
6. Indeed, this is a puzzle that extends to pollution policy generally, not just to cancer policy. 
See, e.g., McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health 
and Environmental Regulation, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 159. 
7. Associate Professor of Business Law at the University of Texas and Associate Director of 
the Center for Legal and Regulatory Studies. 
8. For a more detailed discussion of these regulatory types, see R. PERCIVAL, A. MILLER, C. 
SCHROEDER & J. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 145-59 (1989). Professor McGarity employs a 
nearly identical organizational approach in McGarity, supra note 6. See also Rodgers, Benefits, 
Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVfL. L. 
REV. 191 (1980). 
9. Nonhuman health, environmental, or public welfare effects are relevant to the standard-
setting process under many of the statutes that regulate carcinogens, but the human health effects 
largely dominate the debate over appropriate levels of control, so we can designate these statutes 
as "health-based" without much loss of descriptive accuracy. 
10. For instance, the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set ambient air quality levels for the 
most widely prevalent air pollutants at a level requisite "to protect human health." When Con-
gress has clearly instructed the EPA to ignore costs, the courts have upheld the instruction. See, 
e.g., Lead Indus. Assn. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See generally TVA v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153 (1978). 
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<lards can be pegged to different levels of protection. Cross' zero-risk 
paradigm seeks to eliminate the risks of all adverse health effects, 
while the significant risk approach reduces risk levels not to zero, but 
down below the level determined to be significant to society. 
Sometimes statutes instruct the agency to balance the benefits of 
controls against the costs of installing such controls. 11 None of the 
federal balancing statutes requires agencies to conduct a fully quanti-
fied cost-benefit analysis; instead, they leave to the agency's discretion 
the politically sensitive task of specifying the details of how this "bal-
ance" is to be struck. 12 Still, Cross' paradigm of cost-benefit analysis 
is the specific balancing method that draws the most attention. Devo-
tees often use it as the ideal toward which all our regulatory efforts 
should tend, while critics, especially environmentalists, treat it as their 
primary enemy. 
Health-based standards peg regulation to desired health risk reduc-
tion while ignoring the costs of achieving those reductions; balancing 
standards compare those reductions with such costs. The third basic 
type of standard concentrates on costs and ignores health risk reduc-
tions. Such approaches can be labelled technology-based, because the 
level of pollution control depends on analyses of technology that 
might be employed to abate or control exposure. As with health-based 
standards, it is possible to calibrate technology-based standards to var-
ious levels of stringency, sometimes by specifying how much cost the 
industry is to bear, sometimes by limiting the sophistication of the 
technology upon which the standard will be based. Regulatory stat-
utes that deal with toxic chemicals and carcinogens by employing a 
technology-based standard typically require allowable discharges to be 
set at the level achievable by employing the best available technology 
that the target industry can afford to install. Cross terms this ap-
proach "feasibility analysis." 13 
11. See, e.g., the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) 
(1988) (requiring the EPA to ensure that approved pesticides not pose "unreasonable risk to man 
or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and bene-
fits of [their] use"). 
12. While the balancing statutes enacted by Congress do not mandate quantified cost-benefit 
analysis, Executive Order 12,291, signed by President Reagan in 1981, does mandate that major 
federal rules be preceded by a Regulatory Impact Analysis that identifies benefits and costs and 
that chooses the regulatory option that maximizes net benefits to society. Exec. Order No. 
12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 473-76 (1988). Because maxi-
mizing net benefits seems to require as fully quantified a cost-benefit analysis as possible, E.O. 
12,291 and its implementation by the Office of Management and Budget have been taken to 
establish a presumption in favor of quantification. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986). 
13. An example of a different technology-baSed standard is the "best practicable control 
technology currently available," which water pollution dischargers were required to install by 
1977. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(l)(A) (1988). This standard requires industries 
to employ existing pollution control technology to reduce water pollution discharges until the 
costs of removing additional increments become "wholly out of proportion" with the costs in-
curred to remove earlier increments. See Weyerhaueser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045 n.52 
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When applied to any particular pollution problem, these three ba-
sic approaches lead to three different levels of pollution control, some-
times to three wildly divergent levels of control. Much of the sense of 
confusion attending federal regulation of carcinogens, and a great deal 
of the inconsistency in regulatory actions taken by federal agencies, 
can be attributed to the concurrent existence of these incongruent ap-
proaches, with no clearly articulated explanation for when each of 
them is most appropriate. Not only do they deprive our cancer pre-
vention efforts of any coherent justification, the way some of them 
have been implement~d by federal agencies has contributed to the de-
lay and inactivity characterizing our regulatory efforts. 14 
II 
Cross seeks to bring some order and common sense to this general 
picture by injecting an element of realism and pragmatism into it (p. 
xv). To begin, he depicts cancer policy as stalemated between two 
unrealistic extremes. On one side stands a cadre of "zealous environ-
mentalists" who insist that the zero-risk strategy is the only one ac-
ceptable to deal with a cancer epidemic. Cross thinks this position is 
ultimately "ridiculous" because it fails to recognize that social needs 
other than cancer avoidance also make valid claims on scarce re-
sources (pp. 69, 71). In Cross' view, the ability of zero risk to gain any 
audience is attributable to its advocates' misinforming the public about 
the magnitude of the cancer risk. 
To set the record straight, he marshals evidence showing that 
America's fear of the manmade sources of cancer "has been exagger-
ated considerably" (p. 17). Statistics show that death rates for most 
cancers in the United States have actually declined in this century, 
once the data have been adjusted to account for the aging of the popu-
lation. The singular exception is lung cancer, the one cancer whose 
dominant cause is acknowledged to be a "life-style" choice - smoking 
- and not any industrial pollution or discharge (pp. 18-19). In fact, 
the widely publicized notion that ninety percent of cancers come from 
"environmental causes" trades on a misunderstanding of the original 
study that first drew this conclusion. That study employed the term 
"environmental" very broadly, to include such life-style factors as 
smoking and dietary practices in addition to manmade pollution (pp. 
18-19). Cancers caused by the dissemination of manmade chemicals 
are actually a distinct minority of the cancers that occur in the United 
States today. The leading comprehensive study on the subject con-
cludes that less than ten percent of current cancers are attributable to 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting legislative history; emphasis in original). These controls have been less 
costly and less stringent than feasibility-based controls. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone 
Assn., 449. U.S. 64 (1980). 
14. See pp. 97-133 (discussing implementation efforts). 
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pollution, food additives, pesticides, and occupational exposures. 15 In 
Cross's view, this "realistic" appreciation for the magnitude of the 
problem ought to modulate society's urge to remove all such risks 
from the environment, a position he regards as "too facile" and ulti-
mately ineffective (pp. xiv-xv). 
This does not mean, however, that there are no legitimate grounds 
for demanding that manmade causes be reduced from their current 
levels. Although the cancer situation is not as dire, in historical per-
spective, as commonly supposed, and although manmade sources are 
not the entire explanation of the danger that does exist, frequently can-
cers caused by manmade sources are preventable. So another "ex-
treme" position rejected by Cross is the do-nothing position of 
"representatives of industry [who] seek[] to avoid all regulation" (p. 
142). The ambition of federal policy, Cross concludes, ought to be to 
steer a moderate course between zealous environmentalists, who want 
all risk from manmade sources eliminated, and industry leaders, who 
want no regulation at all (pp. 142-47). "[S]ociety's optimal response 
to the problem lies between these two poles" (p. 15). 
Having stripped away the extremes, Cross advances a number of 
"pragmatic" reform suggestions to move in a moderate direction and 
hence improve federal regulatory performance. 16 He still has at his 
disposal three of his four initial regulatory paradigms, one from each 
of the more general categories referred to a moment ago: significant 
risk, cost-benefit analysis, and feasibility analysis. Any of these three 
paradigms might serve a policy of moderation, because all of them lie 
somewhere between the extremes of zero risk and no additional 
controls. 
· In perhaps the most interesting proposal of the book, Cross argues 
that federal regulatory policy should primarily rely upon feasibility 
analysis (p. 90). Regulation based on feasibility analysis, he says, is 
superior to the other two for an apparently simple reason: whenever 
federal agencies have utilized feasibility analysis to mandate the "use 
of available, effective technology to reduce exposure to carcinogens as 
far as reasonably possible," this approach to regulation has proven the 
"most effective" (pp. 90, 147). 
In reaching that judgment, Cross relies heavily on our twenty-five-
odd years of experience in trying to implement statutes that employ 
different versions of the three basic types of regulation. By attending 
to the lessons of history, he suggests, we can improve on our current 
regulatory patchwork, which has supplied us with real-world experi-
ence with each major type of regulation. That experience seems to 
15. Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer 
in the United States Today, 66 J. NATL. CANCER INST. 1191 (1981). 
16. Pp. xiv-xv. The concluding portion of the book addresses tort reform. This review fo· 
cuses on his critique of the federal regulatory system and his proposals for its reform. 
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reveal a pattern: when agencies operate under the mandate of technol-
ogy-based controls, they are able to write a higher volume of regula-
tions, have those regulations survive court challenges, and 
subsequently see them through to implementation by affected indus-
tries, as compared to insubstantial progress when they use either 
health-based or balancing approaches. I7 
Learning from our regulatory experience is both possible and es-
sential. By presenting a skillful summary of an extraordinarily com-
plex past, Cross contributes importantly to that process. The book's 
lessons from history do not, however, provide sufficient support for the 
choice of feasibility analysis, in part because such history lessons are 
inherently equivocal, a point to which I shall return in a moment. Is 
Even assuming that history speaks with one voice, what we hear from 
that voice will depend upon what we want it to say. When we mine 
history for its "lessons," as we do when seeking guidance concerning 
contemporary public policy issues, we inevitably bring some vision of 
normative order or desirable practices to our reading. Environmen-
tally Induced Cancer and the Law, although an impressive book, ulti-
mately does not succeed in presenting a compelling case for feasibility 
analysis because it fails sufficiently to articulate the desirable goals that 
environmental policy ought to serve. The following section amplifies 
on this point. 
III 
No regulatory technique is immune from criticism, as Cross 
clearly knows. The chapter in which he critiques each of his para-
digms is the most thought-provoking of the book (pp. 69-95). That 
being the case, the choice of one over the others must depend upon 
which combination of advantages and disadvantages supplies the best 
mix. Policymakers in this field, in other words, must necessarily be 
"quasi-utopians," interested not in "perfection but [in] tolerable im-
perfection, tolerable because it is better than anything else they con-
sider attainable though not nearly as good as lots of alternatives that 
can be imagined."I9 This much is surely consistent with the book's 
call for a pragmatic approach. 
However, the book fails to confront an underlying difficulty. As-
certaining which of several options is "better" demands some criterion 
17. See pp. 97-134. Cross' excellent summary of regulatory experience concentrates on car-
cinogens. Other scholars have examined federal pollution policy more broadly, including experi-
ence in regulating common air pollutants and toxic and conventional water pollutants. They 
have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Im-
plementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 
1267 (1985); McGarity, supra note 6. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
19. Krier & Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 405, 
406-07 (1985). 
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of betterness, some principle that might be used to determine which 
among the imperfect options is better. Consider some possibilities. 
We might select one legislative option over another for reasons of sim-
plicity, because it can be more easily administered, because it has more 
favorable distributive consequences, because we find it most compati-
ble with other national programs or objectives, or because we think 
that it best treats individuals as ends and not as means. 20 In other 
words, legitimate criteria for law are diverse. We might organize the 
sorts of disagreements people can have over law by organizing the 
sorts of reasons for valuing law into general categories. For instance, 
people support laws for consequentialist reasons, for their ability to 
produce good results. People also support laws for duty-based rea-
sons, because they believe the laws discharge social obligations or en-
force private ones, irrespective of whether the resulting external effects 
are judged good or bad. Laws can also be seen as expressing values, as 
signifying or embodying some quality or concern. Each of these 
criteria! categories, the consequentialist, the duty-based, and the ex-
pressive, deals in contested concepts and values. The supporters and 
the opponents of federal legislation banning flag-burning, for example, 
disagree about what social message laws respecting the flag should ex-
press. The dispute over "reparations" as a basis for civil rights legisla-
tion is largely a dispute over what society's obligations are. When 
experts on special education argue the desirability of "mainstream-
ing," they are often debating whether the anticipated effects of a law 
mandating such mainstreaming are desirable or not. 
One reason laws are disputed is that people have disagreements 
within each category, disagreeing about what consequences ought to 
be pursued, what duties discharged, or what values expressed. Nor-
mally, maybe always, the arguments advanced for and against laws 
will also span across the categories. Lawmaking involves what 
Thomas Nagel has termed the unity of action and the fragmentation of 
value,21 because single acts of legislation raise a multiplicity of value 
concerns. Our modern society is closely identified with dissensus over 
values, which is why Nagel refers to the phenomenon as a fragmenta-
tion. When we turn to law, this phenomenon ensures an additional 
source of disagreement, for it is to be expected that even if we could 
agree on a menu of legitimate values, we lack consensus on how to 
reconcile conflicts among them. Many people agree, for instance, that 
the exclusionary rule vindicates a social ideal that police and courts 
treat suspects fairly; they also agree that the rule operates to insulate 
some guilty criminals from successful prosecution. One value cuts in 
favor of the rule, the other against. One reason the rule is controver-
sial is that we agree neither on the magnitude of these countervailing 
20. See generally McGarity, supra note 6, at 200-33. 
21. T. NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979). 
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phenomena nor on how to reconcile the clash so as to reach the proper 
judgment, all things considered. 
Within contemporary society, it seems highly implausible that we 
might reach agreement in any area of significant social policy on legiti-
mate ends or objectives and on how to resolve any conflicts among 
those ends or objectives. From our present perspective, the idea that 
ideological lions might lie down with ideological lambs would seem to 
qualify as one definition of utopia itself. Even if we achieved that 
much utopia, however; policymakers might still have to be quasi-uto-
pian actors. We might still face a variety of possible means to accom-
plish stipulated ends and, hence, the need to make comparative 
judgments among them. Everyone may agree, for example, that direc-
tors of corporations should be prevented from making unduly profita-
ble deals with their corporations because of their fiduciary obligations 
to shareholders, and yet some might urge that this norm be enforced 
by prophylactic prohibition of all such deals, while others might sup-
port case-by-case challenges to rescind deals thought to be unfavorable 
to the corporation. In any world in which implementation technolo-
gies are imperfect, we will still need some criteria for selecting among 
imperfect options. 
None of this is startling; in fact, policymaking has probably always 
operated in a context where all this disputing - within the various 
categories of value, among conflicting values, and about how to put 
into effect a stipulated agenda or menu of ends - is assumed to exist. 
"Policymaking" has been defined as the "reconciliation and elabora-
tion of lofty values into operational guidelines for the daily conduct of 
society's business,"22 a definition plainly broad enough to encompass 
all of this. 
In the modern administrative state, however, we see a recurring 
effort to suppress some of these disputes. The crucial move here is to 
divide policymaking into two distinct parts, the value-laden and the 
value-free, and subsequently to treat the first as a "political" and the 
second as a "scientific" activity. As played out in the normal science 
of "policy analysis" or "public administration," this division of labor 
seeks to provide policy analysts with a secure professional niche. 
Theirs will be the task of studying implementation possibilities and 
problems, and of recommending successful strategies to the political 
officials who are charged with formulating the agenda of ends or objec-
tives. The·goal is to isolate the business of determining "operational 
guidelines" from that of "reconcil[ing] and elucidat[ing] . . . lofty 
values."23 
This strategy proves to be incoherent. Any "science" brought to 
22. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 393 
(1981). 
23. Id. 
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policy will come with its own normative baggage, its own set of ends 
and objectives, which may or may not be compatible with the social 
objectives determined by the political branch.24 Science frequently op-
erates, for example, by virtue of simplifying and modeling complex 
phenomena. This results inevitably in foregrounding certain aspects of 
those complex phenomena, while backgrounding others. Especially 
common is the effect that quantification has of "dwarfing soft vari-
ables," meaning that certain values that are difficult to quantify, such 
as dignity values and expressive values, are overshadowed by the more 
readily quantifiable information, such as economic effects.25 
Just this line of argument has been vigorously advanced by some 
opponents of the cost-benefit paradigm, one of Cross' three candidates 
for implementing a moderate cancer policy.26 Cross might have used 
this critique in order to establish a point of superiority for feasibility 
analysis, but he does not. Doing so would require endorsing a norma-
tive order that gives significant weight to the soft variables dwarfed by 
the machinery of cost-benefit analysis. In resting the case for feasibil-
ity analysis so heavily on its effectiveness, but subsequently failing to 
articulate toward what end that paradigm is the most effective instru-
ment, Cross seems to be trying to stay on the science side of the poli-
tics/science division as exclusively as possible, which means trying to 
discuss implementation issues without reference to the substantive 
ends, values, or objectives being implemented.27 
Now it is probably impossible to discuss implementation issues 
without at least mentioning ends, if only in passing. The book dor 
contain a few such "mentions," but fleshing them out fails to 
strengthen the case for feasibility analysis. In the preface, for instance, 
we are told that "[g]overnment's first task is to prevent environmen-
tally induced cancer, insofar as possible, through such regulatory or-
ganizations as the Environmental Protection Agency" (p. xiv). While 
24. One of the early pieces, still among the best, developing this theme is Tribe, Policy Sci-
ence: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972). 
25. A second objection to the politics/science dichotomy is that it ignores the degree to 
which scientists operating in policy-relevant fields must make assumptions or judgments not 
themselves supported by scientific consensus or experimentation. Critics of the division argue 
powerfully that these judgments should not be left on the science side of the divide, and that 
policy will be vulnerable to illegitimate manipulation if it fails to recognize this. See, e.g., Latin, 
Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988). 
26. E.g., Latin, supra note 17. 
27. Should policy scientists find that choices among implementation devices raise further 
conflicts among ends or objectives, as they almost universally do, the analyst has an out. She can 
highlight the dispute, treat it as an unresolved issue, and refer the matter back to the political 
side of the divide for its resolution. In practice, policy analysts make sub rosa value judgments at 
many different points in their analyses, which is one compelling reason not to permit the com-
plete separation of political accountability from professional expertise. See, e.g., G. 
BENVENISTE, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE (2d ed. 1977). For an excellent analysis of the ten-
dency for science and social values to become intertwined, even when the "hard" sciences are 
involved, see Latin, supra note 25. 
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this statement might be taken as expressing an end or goal for environ-
mental policy, treating it that way raises more questions than the book 
answers. First, regulating "insofar as possible" is not defended in the 
book on anything other than instrumental grounds. Second, were reg-
ulation insofar as possible the proper end of policy, then feasibility 
analysis, which requires regulation to the limits of technological feasi-
bility, would seem to be the most logical method to achieve that goal, 
whereas Cross clearly thinks such an approach is illogical, "perhaps 
the most illogical risk management approach."28 "[C]omplete reliance 
on feasibility analysis," Cross says, "is logically unsound" (pp. 92-93). 
Elsewhere, Cross writes that "[i]f government is to prevent cancer, 
it must know the causes of cancer" (p. 1), and that "[a]n understand-
ing of the context of environmentally induced cancer will enable the 
law to better fulfill its preventive and compensatory role" (p. 2). Per-
haps the prevention of "potentially preventable cancers" is the goal of 
policy (p. 2). If so, then the "most effective" regulatory instrument 
would be the one that prevented the highest number of cancers. 
Cancer prevention is a wildly popular and clearly legitimate objec-
tive, but it cannot supply the critical purchase necessary to support the 
claimed superiority of feasibility analysis. If cancer prevention stood 
alone as our social objective, we could accomplish that most directly 
by simply shutting down the chemical industry immediately. 
Indeed, if cancer prevention is the goal, then what of those "zeal-
ous environmentalists" who support the zero-risk paradigm, but 
whose arguments - while "rhetorically" powerful - ultimately "ap-
pear[] somewhat ridiculous" (pp. 69, 70, 71), and whom Cross ac-
cuses of "incorrect, irresponsible and ultimately self-defeating" 
exaggerations of the magnitude of the manmade carcinogen problem 
(p. 36)? Their objective turns out to be the right one, after all. This is 
not at all what Cross advocates. The reason that it is even possible to 
reach such a conclusion stems from an ingredient ·missing from the 
book's argument. Any regulation short of the zero-risk paradigm de-
pends upon there being some countervailing value, one that conflicts 
with pure cancer prevention, that merits a role in policy formation. 
Cross needs such a value to make his case against zero-risk, but the 
book fails to articulate one clearly. We are told we need moderation, 
but moderation describes a capacious territory, and any of the three 
regulatory paradigms can be designed to fit within it. In order to de-
termine which does a better job, we need to know some goal a moder-
ate policy should serve, and hence why moderation seems advisable. 
In the most general of terms, we know, of course, that the compet-
ing value has something to do with the costs of obtaining cancer pre-
vention. Unfortunately, that general thought starts us down the road 
28. P. 147. The reasons feasibility analysis is "illogical" are discussed later in this review. 
See infra Part IV. 
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to yet another conclusion that Cross doesn't want us to draw, for it 
seems to suggest the use of a balancing approach of some sort - even 
cost-benefit analysis itself - as an appropriate basis for cancer policy. 
Actually, selected passages in the book can make one think that 
Cross isn't terribly hostile to that conclusion. Cost-benefit analysis has 
been frequently faulted for requiring data that is, practically speaking, 
often unavailable and that, when available at all, is subject to manipu-
lation by industry interests. Yet Cross brushes such objections aside, 
quoting with approval Aaron Wildavsky's aphorism, "better a flawed 
economics than a bogus politics."29 Cross acknowledges other criti-
cisms of cost-benefit analysis, such as the complaint that it has ethical 
shortcomings, especially in its willingness to put a price on human life, 
yet he concludes that "[c]ost/benefit analysis is neither inherently ethi-
cal nor inherently unethical" (p. 84). Rather, cost-benefit analysis is 
flexible enough to accommodate all sorts of moral and ethical values, 
should the analyst be instructed to incorporate them. 30 After a review 
of all the standard objections that are raised against using cost-benefit 
analysis to decide matters of public health and safety, Cross still con-
cludes that this paradigm is the only approach that "recognizes the 
full range of implications that may result from government control of 
carcinogens."31 
With this as the case "against" cost-benefit analysis, one wonders 
why it has been rejected. Its major shortcomings seem to be data 
availability and manipulability. Yet as Professors Ackerman and 
Stewart have suggested, the former can be addressed by adopting some 
simplifying assumptions and best guesses, pressing all the time for bet-
ter information. 32 As for the latter, it is not obvious that cost-benefit 
analysis suffers from this deficiency to any greater degree than the 
other paradigms. 33 
29. P. 85 (citing A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OP 
POLICYMAKING 156 (1979)). 
30. Cf. Leonard & Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and 
Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 42 (D. MacLean ed. 1986): "(Not] every important social 
value can be represented effectively within the confines of cost-benefit analysis. Some social val-
ues will never fit in a cost-benefit framework and will have to be treated as 'additional considera-
tions' in coming to a final decision. Some ... may be binding constraints." 
31. P. 89. Elsewhere, Cross indicates that he finds the approach of welfare economics to 
environmental problems the most cogent in theory. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 
42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 283-84 (1989). 
32. Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1336-40 
(1985). 
33. Technology-based standards generally are highly dependent upon industry supplied in-
formation on technological capability, installation and operating costs. This provides industry 
ample opportunity to manipulate or obstruct. A study of EP A's implementation of the technol-
ogy-based effiuent standards under the Clean Water Act concluded that "(i]ndustry was capable 
of manipulating the rulemaking process by withholding data on costly, but effective, abatement 
technologies and supplying excessive and confusing data." W. MAGAT, A. KRUPNICK & W. 
HARRINGTON, RULES JN THE MAKING 36 (1986). 
May 1990] Manmade Carcinogens 1495 
The problems in connecting the book's primary policy recommen-
dation with a persuasive argument could be multiplied by reviewing 
the case against its other competitor, the significant risk paradigm, but 
I will leave that to the reader. Inconclusiveness is foreordained, I 
think, by virtue of the book's silence on the subject of policy ends or 
goals. In these circumstances, all that can eventually be said in sup-
port of feasibility analysis is that which Cross does say, articulately 
and well: feasibility analysis has worked, the other two have not. 
And, you might ask, why isn't that sufficiently persuasive? After all, 
many, many people have pointed out the shortcomings of various the-
oretical approaches to health and safety regulation, including feasibil-
ity analysis. At the end of the day, however, theory doesn't prevent 
cancers; effective regulation does. 34 
The choice thus presented, then, is not among plausible, diverse, 
operational guidelines. It is between something and nothing. Here we 
have the bedrock explanation for Cross' apparent conviction that he 
can propose feasibility analysis without an elucidation of the full pano-
ply of conflicting values that surround cancer policy. Whatever one's 
particular constellation of values, no one could object to trading in our 
current sluggish performance for more effective, moderate perform-
ance (except the extremists, and maybe only half of them).35 
Given the premises, this conclusion does indeed follow. Alas, the 
historical account upon which the premises rest can support more 
than one meaning. Even conceding that history demonstrates that fea-
sibility analysis has worked, at the most it also demonstrates only that 
the others have worked less well so far, not that they cannot work. 
Indeed, supporters of either significant risk or cost-benefit analysis can 
legitimately draw some very different historical lessons from those em-
phasized by Cross. 
Much of our current technology-based regulation was drafted 
before we had developed much sophistication in devising more eco-
nomic-oriented strategies, so that the selection of these approaches in-
stead of balancing ones, including those using cost-benefit analysis, 
occurred in a historical context that may have unduly discounted such 
strategies.36 Furthermore, both balancing statutes and significant-risk 
34. Supplying just this kind of effectiveness defense of technology-based standards is the pri-
mary enterprise of Professor Latin's extensive study. Latin, supra note 17; see also McGarity, 
supra note 6. 
35. I suppose even "zealous environmentalists" would endorse feasibility analysis if they 
truly thought the only other choice was doing nothing. That would leave the "industry repre-
sentatives" standing alone. 
36. This claim is amplified in Schroeder, The Evolution of Federal Toxic Substances Policy, in 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II (The Woodrow Wilson Center, 
forthcoming 1990). Once enacted, any form of·legislation creates its own constituency for con-
tinuation, as interested parties develop vested interests in the existing structure. See generally 
Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 655. 
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statutes have been the victims of unrealistic demands for precision and 
data quality, which have made them vulnerable both to public criti-
cism and judicial review. Cross realizes this point, yet fails to appreci-
ate that one way of addressing it would be to lower expectations of 
rigor and precision, so that agencies might take effective action under 
these paradigms. 37 Finally, notwithstanding their slow start, balanc-
ing approaches especially are gaining an experience base indicating 
that some of their claims of superiority over feasibility approaches are 
justified. Both implemented approaches and studies of alternatives to 
existing regulation suggest, for example, that economic approaches to 
regulation are much more cost-effective than technology-based ap-
proaches that attain the same overall pollution reductions.38 So his-
tory is a treacherous ally of feasibility analysis. A plausible argument 
can be made that, were society willing to accept approximations for 
currently hard-to-quantify data, and were courts more willing to sus-
tain regulations based on fairly crude balancing formulas, a regulatory 
regime built around the balancing paradigm would prove as workable 
as a feasibility-based approach. 
IV 
Feasibility analysis cannot be shown to be superior to its competi-
tors on implementation grounds alone, because significant-risk and 
cost-benefit analysis could both be made to work, in the loose sense 
that each could be employed in a "moderate" program of risk reduc-
tion that would be "more effective" than our current system. On 
Cross' account, this leaves the case for feasibility analysis radically di-
minished, for while each of its competitors has its own advantages, 
independent of implementation concerns, the only advantage offered 
for feasibility analysis is this one. Otherwise, Cross considers it logi-
cally unsound. 39 
Giving up on feasibility analysis would nevertheless be decidedly 
premature. After all, it does indeed seem to be gaining a working he-
gemony in the world of practical administration. Several programs 
that began operations under another paradigm have been or are being 
shifted over to a feasibility approach, while those that started under 
feasibility analysis have shown little tendency to migrate elsewhere.40 
On the other hand, whatever their intellectual advantages, significant-
37. Thus, Cross' proposal that the federal courts soften the intensity of their review of agency 
action under cancer control statutes would seem likely to improve the effectiveness of oil the 
moderate paradigms, not just feasibility analysis. See pp. 152-55. 
38. Major studies are summarized in Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 32, at 1334-40. 
39. Pp. 92-93, 147. Cross argues that significant-risk is supported ethically on contractarian 
grounds and that cost-benefit analysis is the only paradigm that permits consideration of all 
relevant social concerns raised by cancer exposure. See pp. 75-76, 89. 
40. The two most prominent programs that have or are being shifted are the water toxics 
program and the air toxics program. 
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risk and cost-benefit approaches still look hamstrung. Significant-risk 
analysis remains hobbled by the absence of a working consensus on 
what risks are significant, and the candid use of cost-benefit analyses 
founders on the question of placing monetary value on a human life. 
As Cross has well recounted, under currently prevailing conditions, 
feasibility analysis does seem to work, whereas significant-risk and 
cost-benefit analyses do not. Even if this evidence does not support 
claims of inherent implementation superiority, it does trace a tendency 
in regulatory development that itself needs some explaining. 
We can make some headway toward such an explanation by re-
versing the relationship Cross sees between the implementation advan-
tages of feasibility analysis and claims that it is superior. Instead of 
concluding that feasibility analysis is superior because it can be imple-
mented more effectively than the other paradigms, we might conclude 
that feasibility analysis has been implemented more effectively because 
it is superior, not for technical, implementation reasons, but on nor-
mative grounds. It just might be that because feasibility analysis bet-
ter expresses the underlying constellation of values people wish to 
vindicate in their environmental policy, implementation has met less 
resistance: we have been more willing to tolerate simplifying assump-
tions, and we are more united in the conviction that regulations based 
on this approach ought to be carried through. In contrast, because 
significant-risk and cost-benefit analyses express "those underlying val-
ues less well, they are viewed suspiciously, there is more resistance to 
implementation, and there is less willingness to engage in the simplify-
ing assumptions necessary to make any quasi-utopian regulatory ap-
proach work.41 
This point can be made in terms of the "logic" of a regulatory 
paradigm. The logic of a set of operational guidelines, or a regulatory 
paradigm, turns on a comparison of its internal structure and order of 
relationships among decision criteria to the rationale or justification 
for creating those guidelines. If this internal structure mirrors or re-
sembles the structure of the argument that justifies the guidelines, we 
can say that those guidelines exhibit a transparent logic, one that il-
luminates or reveals their justification. For instance, welfare econom-
ics justifies regulation by arguing that society should promote courses 
of action maximizing human preferences, as exhibited by the willing-
ness to pay of individuals affected by the action. Cost-benefit analysis, 
41. Occasionally, people attempt to study the motives of advocates for different positions in 
environmental disputes. Results seem to suggest that strident disagreement on so-called imple-
mentation issues frequently indicates that deeper, "philosophical" differences are providing much 
of the animus for the dispute. See, e.g., R. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: 
THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EP A's BUBBLE 9-10 (1986) (study of disagreements over the imple-
mentation of emissions trading policy "found that disagreements over political and philosophical 
concerns were more vigorous than those over implementation issues and that conflicts over im-
plementation issues were most intense when they most reflected underlying philosophical 
concerns"). 
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with its consideration of costs and benefits and its decision rule of se-
lecting the course of action that maximizes the net of benefits over 
costs, tracks the structure of this normative justification. Thus, if one 
begins with a welfare economics justification for public policy, cost-
benefit analysis is a "logical" regulatory structure to employ for its 
implementation. 
Not all regulatory structures possess such a transparent logic. 
Consider, for example, the much-maligned Delaney clause for color 
additives, which requires the Food and Drug Administration to ban 
color additives for food if they have been shown to induce cancer in 
laboratory animals.42 Although the clause has been criticized as abso-
lutist, thereby prohibiting the FDA from making cost-benefit compari-
sons in individual regulatory decisions, it just might have a cost-benefit 
justification. Suppose Congress determined that having the FDA per-
form individualized cost-benefit analyses for each color additive would 
not improve the quality of the program's decisionmaking sufficiently 
to offset the time and expense involved in doing so. 43 Congress might 
then conclude that the cost-beneficial regulatory option was to create 
an operational guideline that did not permit the case-by-case weighing 
of costs and benefits. If this were in fact the justification for the Dela-
ney clause, we would have to conclude that this regulatory program 
lacked a transparent logic. The internal structure of the regulatory 
program, those criteria and relationships relevant to reaching a regula-
tory decision, would not mirror the structure of this hypothetical wel-
fare economics justification for the program.44 
With this definition at band, we can express a hypothesis about the 
superiority of feasibility analysis: contrary to Cross' view, feasibility 
analysis may be superior because it is more transparently logical than 
its competitors, not less, in that its internal structure more closely re-
sembles the underlying values, and their relationships to one another, 
that make up one persuasive justification for environmental regulation. 
In the remainder of this Part, I shall explore this possibility, once 
again limited to a comparison of feasibility analysis with the single 
alternative of cost-benefit analysis. 
42. 21 u.s.c. § 376 (1988). 
43. Considerations that might support such a decision include (a) a belief that lack of data 
will make individualized cost-benefit analyses inaccurate; (b) a belief that most color additives, 
which serve cosmetic functions only, would fail a cost-benefit test; (c) a belief that the gains to be 
had from efforts to discriminate among different color additives through individualized cost-
benefit inquiry would be outweighed by the costs of acquiring the necessary information to per-
form those studies, even if the information eventually gathered was reliable. 
44. As a historical explanation of Congress' motivations, the account in the text is 
counterfactual. For a detailed exploration of Congress' probable motives in enacting the several 
Delaney clauses, see Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delan(!y Clause: Repudiation of Con-
gressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1988). 
However, an argument similar to that in the text has been advanced as a justification for the 
Delaney clause. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and 
Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 656-57 (1978). 
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A convenient way to begin exploring the logic of feasibility analy-
sis is by reviewing what environmentalists find deficient in cost-benefit 
analysis, and in the normative justifications offered by welfare econom-
ics for it. Economic analysis approaches the value conflict that sur-
rounds cancer regulatory policy as it approaches all such conflicts, by 
assimilating it to the general problem of allocating scarce resources. 
In principle, all such conflicts should be resolved by producing that 
mix of goods that maximizes the satisfaction of individual preferences 
for them, as measured by individual willingness to pay. As we have 
just seen, cost-benefit analysis is a logical regulatory paradigm for car-
rying out that task. 
Thus, when Cross refers to feasibility analysis as illogical, he seems 
implicitly to be assuming that the underlying justificatory argument 
for regulation is that given by welfare economics. Unlike cost-benefit 
analysis, the structure of feasibility analysis provides no recognition of 
human health benefits, and hence has no way of conceiving of a func-
tion that smoothly "trades off" such benefits for costs. Because it is 
illogical in this way, feasibility analysis can produce perverse results 
when viewed from the economics perspective. It can reduce overall 
welfare both by overregulating (by imposing costly technologies on a 
facility that is located in a sparsely inhabited area and therefore is 
causing few harms) and by underregulating (by permitting the contin-
ued operation of a facility located in a very densely populated area, 
where cost-benefit analysis would recommend closing the facility 
entirely). 
This much is well understood. Equally well understood is that 
many individuals (whether "zealous environmentalists" or not) who 
contemplate the issues raised by difficult environmental choices come 
to conclude that cost-benefit analysis seriously misrepresents the val-
ues· at stake. To be sure, advocates of environmental protection disa-
gree over the nature of what is being misrepresented. Mark Sagoff, for 
example, contends that environmental values reflect "principles," or 
components of reasoned ethical systems, as contrasted to consumer 
"preferences," and that it is the demand for judgment under a regime 
of reasons instead of according to a regime of willingness-to-pay that 
counsels rejecting cost-benefit analysis.45 Daniel Farber, on the other 
hand, while critical of Sagoff's sharp distinction between principle and 
preference, also argues against cost-benefit analysis. Environmental 
values have worth independent of their ability to advance human wel-
fare, but advancing reasoned arguments is not a necessary prelude to 
valuing, he says, because "to value something is simply to care about 
45. See M. SAGOFF, THE EcONOMY OF THE EARTH 93, 102 (1988). For criticisms of the 
distinction between principles and preferences, see Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to 
Temptatlons of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Values by Any Other Name Is Preference (Book 
Review), 87 MICH. L. REv. 1631 (1989); and Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the 
Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1021 (1989). 
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it."46 Farber explains this aspect of valuing the environment: 
[T]he reason most people value the environment is emotional, not be-
cause of some elaborate syllogism. 
. . . The act of valuing something is somewhat like caring about a 
person, and demanding that a person justify his love for another seems 
decidedly strange. Values are simply not things that normally require 
rational justifications.47 
And so for environmental values.48 
While Sago:ff and Farber disagree on a good deal, they share in 
common the claim that cost-benefit analysis should be viewed with 
suspicion because such analysis misrepresents the environmental val-
ues they want to protect. This view does not contest the instrumental 
adequacy of cost-benefit analysis to justify stringent regulation. Cost-
benefit analysis has, in fact, been a friend of environmental objectives 
on many occasions, often enabling environmentalists to make a case 
for more stringent or protective measures. Nevertheless, and despite 
the fact that the cost-benefit paradigm is tremendously flexible, capa-
ble of reflecting whatever values individuals may happen to have, 
many environmentalists view cost-benefit analysis with suspicion be-
cause it performs this "reflecting" in a very specific way. Cost-benefit 
analysis is exclusively sensitive to the "commodity value" of the out-
put of regulatory programs, 49 and environmentalists believe this exclu-
sivity results in a distorted reflection of many environmental values. 
Commodification permits the representation of any value in terms 
of a single metric - consumer willingness to pay. This characteristic 
is extremely important in explaining cost-benefit's flexibility. It is, 
however, just the characteristic that environmentalists believe is defi-
cient. Regardless of how their claim is described - whether as the 
claim that individuals (and, some insist, animals) possess inherent 
46. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 345. 
47. Id. at 345-47. 
48. Carol Rose has also been critical of Sagoff's preferences/principles distinction, and she 
provides yet another characterization of the deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis. For her, the 
principal problem is that the economic approach may reinforce an impoverished rhetoric, one 
that condones selfish behavior and fosters the belief that values are private and not subject to 
discussion. This fights against the ambition of environmentally concerned citizens (1) to engage 
others in cooperative and to a certain extent altruistic behavior and (2) to bring value differences 
out into the public arena, where they can be discussed and debated. See Rose, supra note 45. 
49. See Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54, 56 (1988): 
"[A] commodity value [is] a good that is appropriately produced and distributed in accordance 
with ... four norms." These norms describe and define market exchanges: 
First, in determining the production and distribution of goods, the market does not rec-
ognize any distinction between wants and principles or needs. Second, the parties to a mar-
ket exchange have no precontractual obligations to provide the goods being exchanged. 
Third, the power of an individual to promote her interests in the market is a function of her 
financial resources and relative competitive position. Finally, the market provides an ave-
nue for the expression of discontent through exit, not voice. 
Id. at 56. 
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value,50 or as the claim that the regime of reasons is normatively prior 
to valuing goods in the market, and hence can legitimately establish 
constraints on what can be traded there,51 or as the claim that individ-
uals "simply care" about things in ways other than by placing a com-
modity value on them - environmentalists assert the policy relevance 
of other ways of valuing. Furthermore, and this is the key idea here, 
these other ways of valuing are incommensurable with, and hence not 
reducible to, commodity valuation. 52 By virtue of its structural denial 
of any smooth comparability between costs and benefits, then, feasibil-
ity analysis resonates with an important feature of environmental 
thought in a way that cost-benefit analysis cannot. 
To see a second important dimension to the topic of regulatory 
logic, we must supplement Cross' call to be realistic with yet another 
dose of realism, this time of the Legal Realist variety. The Realists' 
persistent attacks on formal structures in law and policy drove home 
the point that what one takes to be the "natural" or "normal" base-
line, from which deviation requires justification, has a profound influ-
ence on the shape of positive law.53 In constitutional law, for example, 
Lochner-era jurisprudence is partially explained by the Supreme 
Court's adopting a "common law" baseline, in which human relations 
under the operations of common law doctrines of property, contract, 
and tort required no defense, but government intervention to alter 
such relations did. The post-Lochner era, in contrast, at least partially 
50. E.g., T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 235 (1983). 
51. Richard Andrews has described this approach to public policy as the "philosophy of 
normative constraints." He writes: 
In this conceptual framework, government is not simply a corrective instrument at the mar-
gins of economic markets but [a] •.. central arena in which the members of society choose 
and legitimize ... their collective values. The principal purposes of legislative action are to 
weigh and affirm social values and to define and enforce the rights and duties of members of 
the society, through representative democracy. The purpose of administrative action is to 
put into effect these affirmations by the legislature, not to rebalance them by the criteria of 
economic theory. 
Andrews, Cost-Benefit Analysis as Regulatory Reform, in Cosr BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATIONS: PoLmcs, ETHICS, AND METHODS 107, 112 (D. Swartzman, R. 
Lirolf & K. Croke eds. 1982). See generally Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Prefer-
ences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129 (1986) (describing view of government in which laws can be 
based on society's "preferences for preferences," meaning, among other things, that law can 
legitimately constrain, rather than simply enforce market outcomes). 
52. E.g., Lukes, Making Sense of Moral Conflict, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 127 
(N. Rosenblum ed. 1989). Lukes writes: 
[We would do well to] "suspend the monistic assumption underlying so much of moral 
theory" and "acknowledge that not everything is good or right to the extent that it is com-
mensurable with respect to any single standard." 
The key idea, then, is that there is no single currency or scale on which conflicting 
[incommensurable] values can be measured, and that where a.conflict occurs no rationally 
compelling appeal can be made to some value that will resolve it. 
Id. at 134-35 (quoting c. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY-10 (1987)). 
53. See, e.g., Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988); Sunstein, Lochner's 
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). The more contentious lesson, of course, was that, 
although reasoning from baselines seems inescapable, there are no neutral or natural ones. See 
id. at 903-10. 
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repudiated that baseline, permitting much more government interven-
tion into, for example, labor-management relations.s4 
Assumptions about baselines can often be determinative of govern-
ment decisions, whatever regulatory paradigm, including cost-benefit, 
one chooses. Consider a choice between a stringent environmental 
measure and the status quo. If one starts with the baseline assumption 
that the victims of the action have a right to be free from harm or 
environmental degradation, as environmentalists typically do, strin-
gent environmental protection will appear to be the "normal" situa-
tion, and inaction, preserving the status quo, will require justification. 
A cost-benefit analysis of the decision would value the "benefits" of a 
decision to pollute by the polluters' willingness to pay to degrade the 
environment, and would value "costs" by the willingness of victims to 
accept payment to give up their baseline position. Using these guide-
lines, cost-benefit analysis may very well support the stringent envi-
ronmental measure. ss . On the other hand, if the baseline were 
switched, so that the status quo of costless pollution is taken as the 
baseline, then the victims of pollution will be viewed as the benefi-
ciaries of stringent controls and the polluters as those who must bear 
the costs of giving up their baseline position. The value of benefits will 
now be calculated according to victims' willingness to pay. If this is 
substantially less than their willingness to accept payment, cost-benefit 
analysis may now favor the status quo. S6 In other words, cost-benefit 
analysis will end up favoring the persons whose interests received pref-
erence initially by virtue of the location of the baseline, so that where 
the analysis starts will determine where it ends.s7 
One of the principal objectives of the environmental movement has 
been to reconfigure the baseline in many matters of environmental pol-
icy and health and safety protection. Early on, environmentalists 
noted that common law rules are inherently biased in favor of despoil-
54. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 903-10. The contrast between Lochner and post-Lochner 
jurisprudence is also one concerning the degree of justification the government must supply for 
its interventions. 
55. See e.g., M. SAGOFF, supra note 45, at 74-88. 
56. Imagine John Muir being asked how much he would accept as payment for converting 
Yosemite National Park into an amusement park. Now imagine how much he would be willing 
to pay to prevent that from occurring. While the latter amount would probably be substantial in 
Muir's case, it would also quite likely be far less than the first sum - if he were willing to price 
the matter at all. Willingness to pay, after all, is always constrained by the size of one's bank 
account while willingness to forgo payment is potentially limitless. 
57. This point has often been expressed by noting that cost-benefit analysis is indeterminate, 
and that the results of the analysis often depend upon whether individual preferences are calcu-
lated by reference to their asking prices (willingness to accept payment) or their offering prices 
(willingness to pay) for the goods or services in question. See, e.g., Farber, Plastic Trees, supra 
note 46, at 352-54; Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase 
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 678-95 (1979); Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-07 (1981). 
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ers of the environment. 58 Under common law norms, such individuals 
can generally act without court approval, whereas persons damaged or 
potentially damaged by their actions have the burden of initiating ex-
pensive legal action to stop them. Even worse, where legally sufficient 
proof is not readily available, these lawsuits will be unsuccessful. 59 An 
important component of the environmental agenda of the 1960s and 
1970s urged adoption of a new baseline, which Judge McGowan once 
summarized as follows: "Hitherto, the right of the polluter was pre-
eminent, unless the damage caused by· pollution could be proven. 
Henceforth, the right of the public to a clean environment would be 
pre-eminent, unless pollution treatment was impractical or 
unachievable. " 60 
The preceding suffices for a preliminary sketch of the logic of feasi-
bility analysis as applied to the problem of manmade carcinogens. 
Many Americans believe that public policy should be predicated upon 
the "preeminen[ce]" of a deep-seated respect for human life, a respect 
that Cross notes plays a prominent role in debates about cancer risk. 61 
Giving preeminence to respect for life does not mean that protecting 
life is lexically prior to all other values - does not mean, in other 
words, that public policy must always be willing to spend additional 
resources to reduce risk, no matter what the other demands on re-
sources may be. Precisely what it does mean would require much 
greater and detailed exploration of candidate value systems than we 
have so far conducted, but two characteristics of what most environ-
mentalists take it to mean have already been suggested. First, protect-
ing human life (and; more generally, the living environment).ought to 
play a more prominent role in establishing our social baseline, so that 
measures that deny complete protection are the measures that require 
explanation. Second, respect for human life is a value incommensura-
ble with the commodity value of a life. 
Adopting these two ideas has a profound effect on an assessment of 
the logic of regulatory paradigms. Typically, cost-benefit analysis em-
ploys commodity valuation exclusively, and operates under an implicit 
baseline of the status quo. As a consequence of this choice of the base-
line, the question, "Why are you regulating this private activity ·at 
all?" appears to be the "natural" one to ask. 62 Moves away from the 
58. Krier, Enviroi:zmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LA w AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 105, 107 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970). 
59. As was the case with efforts to address carcinogens through traditional common law 
actions. See supra sources· cited in note 4. 
60. Weyerhaeuser. Co. v. Costje, 590 F.2d 1011, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
6L See, e.g., p. 75. 
62. Despite the inroads of enyironmentalism ~ver the past 20 years, this baseline may well 
still be the dominant one in policy circles. An example of it at work can be found in the excellent 
study of air pollution regulation by Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler. They urged that 
Congress require the EPA to justify its regulations according to the environmental benefits that 
would be achieved by them. "[A]t least," they argued, EPA would be "openly arguing about the 
1504 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1483 
status quo baseline require justification. Commodity valuation then 
necessitates that such justification come from a determination that a 
regulation's costs are outweighed by the regulation's benefits, as calcu-
lated under the assumption that victims will be hypothetically paying 
polluters to abate. 
All of this changes dramatically if the baseline and approach to 
valuation change. If the baseline against which policies must be justi-
fied is taken to be freedom from the harm of pollution, then the salient 
question changes from "Why are you regulating?" to "Why are you 
allowing risky activity?" The effect of rejecting commodity valuation 
as the exclusive instrument for responding to that question then pre-
cludes a simple cost-benefit response. Feasibility analysis implicitly 
suggests another answer: as a first approximation, we might allow 
risky behavior when we are concerned that the effects of still tighter 
controls would cause substantial social dislocation. That answer is by 
no means free from controversy, but it is, I believe, an answer that 
many would find at least initially worthy of consideration. Elsewhere 
I have argued that respect for life must under some circumstances give 
way to competing values, including the value we place on human be-
ings being accorded a meaningful opportunity to formulate and pursue 
life plans. 63 The value we place on human flourishing, as contrasted to 
the value of human existence, strikes me as the proper place to begin 
to flesh out a justification for less-than-absolute protection against risk. 
Substantial social dislocation of the kind that would ensue if risk-cre-
ators are regulated beyond the point of technological and economic 
feasibility can upset living patterns, shattering the hopes, ambitions, or 
plans of affected individuals. Provided the residual risk that remains 
after all feasible controls are in place is modest enough, an accommo-
dation to competing values at the point of feasibility may seem desira-
ble. In fact, I take the growing deployment of feasibility analysis as 
some evidence that this is so. 
* * * 
The foregoing suggests that regulatory paradigms compete with 
one another at the normative as well as at the implementation levels. 
The feasibility approach is not an illogical approach to regulation, for 
it resonates with an underlying justificatory structure that treats 
human life as a preeminent value and that further postulates that the 
values implicated by many regulatory conflicts are incommensurable. 
If, as I believe, a significant segment of the American population gen-
right question[): how serious is the risk to human health?" B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, 
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 103 (1981). The idea that regulation demands justification by invok-
ing health risk reductions assumes the status quo baseline. For feasibility analysis to appear 
logically sound, it must appeal to a different baseline entirely. 
63. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986). 
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erally subscribes to such a justificatory structure, pointing out the 
logic of feasibility analysis helps explain its implementation successes. 
An argument of this type does not, however, supply sufficient rea-
sons to prefer feasibility analysis. On the one hand, such an argument 
has indicated differences between the logic of this approach and the 
logic underlying cost-benefit analysis, but it has not shown the superi-
ority of the one over the other. Indeed, we ought to attribute some of 
the continuing confusion over which regulatory paradigm to employ 
to the unresolved contest among the quite different logics each 
presents for public consideration. On the other hand, selection of a 
ruling logic would still not render self-evident the selection of regula-
tory paradigms. Implementation considerations, including the consid-
erations that receive careful attention in Professor Cross' book, will 
continue to influence the shape that operational guidelines take. 
While an understanding of feasibility analysis' logic is therefore in-
sufficient to end the struggle among competing paradigms, it remains a 
necessary prelude to any progress in this area. If feasibility analysis is 
going to be the answer, we ought to understand that the questions 
being answered include normative ones as well as technical ones. 
